Abstract: In Bangladesh, highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 is endemic in poultry. This study aimed to understand the biosecurity conditions and farmers' perception of avian influenza biosecurity in Bangladeshi small commercial chicken farms. During 2011-2012, we conducted observations, in-depth interviews and group discussions with poultry farmers in 16 farms and in-depth interviews with seven local feed vendors from two districts. None of the farms were completely segregated from people, backyard poultry, other animals, households, other poultry farms or large trees. Wild birds and rodents accessed the farms for poultry feed.
INTRODUCTION
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses have caused widespread mortality among poultry. In humans, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported a total of 846 HPAI cases with a 53% case fatality rate between 2003 and February 2016 (WHO 2016 . Transmission of avian influenza to humans poses a risk of coinfection and genetic reassortment of influenza viruses, which could lead to the emergence of a novel influenza virus strain with pandemic potential (Jackson et al. 2009 ). Direct contact with infected poultry, objects and surfaces contaminated by infected droppings or slaughtering by-products is considered the main routes of human infection (WHO 2005) .
Smallholder commercial poultry production may be at greater risk of HPAI infection than backyard production (Alhaji and Odetokun 2011) and large industrial commercial production because of the high number of contacts with intermediaries (i.e., traders, suppliers, transporters) and the lack of physical barriers to infection (FAO 2008) . From 2004 to 2007 in Vietnam, 80% of outbreaks occurred on farms with 51-3000 birds (Burgos et al. 2008) . Subdistricts with small commercial farms were associated with a high risk of H5N1 infection in Thailand (Tiensin et al. 2009 ).
In Bangladesh, 549 outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 were confirmed in 52 of 64 districts from 2007 (OIE 2013 . Bangladesh has reported eight human cases of H5N1 (WHO 2016) , including three among poultry workers (IEDCR 2012a, b) and one fatality (Rahman 2013) . Bangladesh is particularly at risk of emerging infections because of its high population density and widespread contact between people and animals. Global connectivity through transport networks means that emerging infections in Bangladesh present global pandemic risks (Tatem et al. 2006) . Small-scale commercial poultry farms (poultry population 2000) account for 81% of the total commercial poultry farms in Bangladesh (Department of Livestock Services 2012) and 44% of the 549 farms where confirmed cases have occurred (OIE 2013) .
To reduce the introduction and spread of infectious diseases, including HPAI, into and from commercial poultry farms, the Government of Bangladesh recommended a set of biosecurity measures in 2010 (Department of Livestock Services 2010). Practices and perceptions data from small commercial farms may provide new insights into developing interventions to further reduce risk. These data may assist Asian and African countries with similar farming systems that report HPAI outbreaks (FAO 2007) . This study of small commercial chicken farms explores biosecurity conditions, farmers' perception of avian influenza and biosecurity, farmers' motivation to use biosecurity measures and constraints to implementing and maintaining government recommendations.
METHODS

Study Site and Data Collection
Three anthropologists visited 16 poultry farms from Gazipur and Tangail districts in Bangladesh from September 2011 to January 2012. We selected these districts because these were among the districts with the highest number of commercial poultry farms in Bangladesh (Dolberg 2008) . The Gazipur site was peri-urban, located near main traffic routes to the capital city ( Figure 1 ). The Tangail site was rural and more remote, located in the highlands. Purposive selection of the farms was based on their close proximity to each other and geographically distributed in a way that facilitated obtaining an understanding of the interconnectedness among the participants. Eight of these farms produced broilers (raised for meat production) and eight produced layers (raised for egg production). We included two farms where the government culled birds during the avian influenza outbreak in 2008 to explore whether there was any difference between the practices and perceptions of these famers and those of other farmers.
Livestock officers at the sub-district level introduced the team to the community vaccinators and avian influenza workers, who worked closely with the farmers and introduced the team to the farmers. The team then repeatedly visited the farms over several days to build a trusting relationship with the farmers through interactive conversation about the objective of the study and our commitment to confidentiality.
The team collected data using multiple tools (Table 1) . First, they conducted a spot observation by recording the presence and condition of certain farm elements to provide a 'snapshot' of the biosecurity conditions at each farm. Spot observation is a less-intrusive and less-reactive approach compared to structured observation and is often used in research to assess hygiene practices (Ruel and Arimond 2002) . The team visited the farms without informing the farmers about the exact day and time of the visits to reduce reactivity. During the spot observations, the team also drew a map at each farm to record the layout of the chicken shed. To assess the location of the farms in relation to the different elements of its surroundings, the team recorded distances using Global Positioning System (GPS) devices.
The team conducted 57 h of observations distributed across the 16 farms in 44 sessions. The team recorded detailed descriptions of biosecurity practices and explored issues identified during the spot observations during these sessions. The number of observation sessions varied based on data saturation (i.e., the point at which no new data emerge) to explore a particular topic. The duration of observation sessions varied based on the activities under observation. Each team member observed a specific activity by rotation to ensure similar exposure of all team members to different activities. To reduce observation bias, the team Figure 1 . Location of study farms in Gazipur and Tangail study sites, 2011-2012. spent several hours at the farms to blend in and normalize their presence prior to the actual observation; the first several hours of observation were discarded. The team conducted in-depth interviews with farmers, one at each farm, to explore practices related to biosecurity and conducted two group discussions. Issues identified during observations were explored during interviews to clarify reasons for certain behaviors.
The team also interviewed seven local vendors of chicks, feed or medicine, who the farmers mentioned as sources of information. The team used semistructured guidelines for observations, interviews (S1 Table) and discussions with topics to explore and probe. The team attended all training sessions on avian influenza and/or biosecurity that took place in the study areas during data collection. They took detailed notes of observations and audio recorded the interviews and group discussions. They discussed findings and reviewed guidelines at the end of each day to ensure consistency in their assessments.
To understand the practices of the three principle elements of biosecurity-segregation, cleaning and disinfection (FAO 2008), we followed the biosecurity guidelines for the commercial poultry industry issued by the government (Department of Livestock Services 2010) (S2 Table) .
Data Analysis
The research team organized the data from the mapping and spot observations according to biosecurity indicators. They completed observation notes and transcribed the recorded data. They analyzed the data using an inductive approach (Thomas 2006) . The team considered the government recommendations as a reference point and iden- In-depth interview with farmer Self-reported practices related to biosecurity, i.e., daily measures followed to protect chickens from disease, perception of poultry disease, avian influenza and biosecurity 8 8 1 6
In-depth interview with local vendors of chicks, feed or medicine Perception of poultry disease, avian influenza and biosecurity 7 7
Group discussion with farmers Constraints to and motivation for implementing and maintaining biosecurity measures, feasible alternatives 1 1 2 tified variations in biosecurity practices and perceptions of the participants. They repeatedly read the notes and transcriptions to identify different underlying themes and categorized data according to these themes. They then prepared a summary of each theme (Vaismoradi et al. 2013) . The first two authors separately looked for similarities and patterns for analysis to identify different dimensions and to reduce researcher bias. They cross-checked the findings by comparing the data from different tools and categories of participants and explored patterns in information flow and networks among the participants.
RESULTS
Demographics
Most (81%, 13/16) of the farmers were male; their mean age was 38 years. The total monthly income of the farmers' households ranged from US$ 78 to 841 (median US$ 255). Half of the farmers had a secondary or higher level of education. Chicken farming was the main source of household income for 11 farmers. The median number of chickens raised per farm was 665 (range 320-2300). The local vendors we interviewed were all men with a mean age of 38. Only two vendors had received formal vocational training in commercial poultry farming.
Description of Chicken Sheds
The area of chicken sheds ranged from 40 to 229 m 2 (median 79 m 2 for all poultry or a median of 0.13 m 2 per chicken). The walls of the chicken sheds were constructed of bamboo, wood or cement poles with wire or bamboo mesh to allow airflow. The roofs were corrugated metal.
One broiler shed had a cement floor; the rest had mud flooring. Layer chickens were raised in cages, and most sheds had cement floors; however, two layer farmers raised chickens on mud floors to minimize costs.
Segregation
Location and Layout of the Sheds
All chicken sheds were located on the owners' premises at less than the recommended distance to the household, other commercial poultry farms and water bodies (Table 2). Farmers did not follow recommendations related to human access and other animals in the shed, and 15/16 farms had incomplete or no fencing (Table 3) . Farmers with incomplete fencing reported that they prioritized fencing the sides exposed to the road or walkways. The team commonly observed a gap between the roof and the mesh and/or openings in the mesh. For short-term broiler farming, farmers reported using cheaper narrower wire mesh, which did not fully cover the exposed area. Farmers reported that wild birds and backyard poultry entered the shed and ate poultry feed. Farmers considered rodents a nuisance to their chickens and poultry feed and took measures to prevent them (Table 3 ). The team observed rodent holes in the mud floor at three farms.
Traffic and Equipment in and Out of the Sheds
Family members entered the sheds without disinfection to help with farming activities (Table 3) . Litter buyers, egg buyers and vaccinators visited multiple farms in a day and entered chicken sheds without disinfection. Vehicles carried chicks and feed to multiple farms and were usually parked adjacent to the door of the shed without disinfection. Farmers shared feed and equipment, such as feeders, drinkers and weighing tools, among farms. However, farmers did not usually allow egg buyers to bring their egg trays inside the shed. Farmers collected eggs in their own egg trays or baskets and sold the eggs to the buyer, who visited the farms 2-7 times a week and travelled the area collecting eggs from several farms.
Managing Sick and Dead Chickens
The team observed sick and healthy chickens housed separately inside the same shed or inside the farmers' bedrooms. Twelve farmers reported burying dead poultry, though the team observed only one farmer burying a carcass. Three farmers dumped carcasses in the bushes or in an open field, two farmers fed carcasses to dogs.
Cleaning and Disinfection
Preparing the Shed for the Next Batch
Broiler chickens were kept until they were 28-35 days old. Layer chickens were kept for 18-24 months. All farmers reported cleaning and disinfecting the shed before buying a new batch of chicks and mentioned using lime (calcium hydroxide) as a disinfectant (S3 Table) . Their cleaning focused on the floor and equipment, although the government recommended cleaning and disinfecting the entire facility. Farmers removed the litter by scraping the mud floor with sharp-edged tools, swept the floor, smeared new mud and allowed it to dry for 2-7 days. They used water to wash feces away from cemented floors to the grounds or ditches adjacent to the shed. They also swept and dusted the walls and cages of the shed. Although the government recommended a minimum of 14 days between batches, farmers reported 4-21 days between batches. The gap was influenced by the time required for cleaning, the market rate for day-old chicks, whether diseases were reported in the area and convenience.
Regular Cleaning and Disinfection of the Shed and Equipment
Farmers used locally available materials such as lime, bleaching powder (calcium hypochlorite) and potash (potassium permanganate) (S3 Table) , as disinfectants at the concentration, quantity and frequency suggested by their sources of information (Figure 2 ). The only regular Table) . Although farmers reported washing and/ or disinfecting utensils, feed sacks, medicine packets and equipment used for collecting litter, the team rarely observed these practices. The vaccinator and debeaker used the same equipment for several farms. The vaccinator reported boiling the syringe between farms but the team did not observe this.
Litter and Feces Management
The ten farms that raised chickens on the floor produced dry litter, a mixture of chicken feces and bedding material made from rice husk and sawdust. Farms that raised chickens in cages produced semiliquid feces, which they also called litter. These two types of litter were managed differently (S3 Table) . In all farms, feces were either sold or used as fish feed or dumped in open fields without treatment. In Gazipur, litter buyers bought the semiliquid feces from several farms everyday for 20 taka (US$ 0.3) per drum (approx 41 l) and sold the litter to local fish farmers for 50 taka (US$ 0.7) per drum. Tangail layer farmers washed away the semiliquid feces themselves and dug a ditch behind the shed to contain the semiliquid feces. When the ditch became full and dry, they sold the feces for fish feed and fertilizer. None used any disinfectant on the floor during regular litter disposal.
Personal Hygiene
Disinfecting hands and feet before entering and after exiting the shed was seldom observed (Table 4) . When disinfection was observed, it was mainly disinfecting feet before entering the shed and disinfecting hands after exiting the shed. Although not explicitly discouraged in the recommendations, we observed farmers consuming food, touching their eyes, faces, bodies and clothes while working in the farms without first washing their hands. Nine farmers had separate footwear for the shed, and ten farms had functioning sprayers (S3 Table) . Footbaths were not observed in use. No one changed their clothes or used gloves or masks while working in the shed. Five farmers reported sleeping inside the shed to protect chickens from rodents and foxes.
Farmers' Perception of Avian Influenza and Biosecurity
Source of Information
Farmers most frequently mentioned other farmers and the local vendors of chicks, feed and medicines, as sources of information and reported following the instructions of the vendors for farming and caring for sick poultry. Farmers usually paid the vendors in cash for chicks but received medicines and feed on credit, which they repaid after selling the chickens or eggs. Veterinary practitioners employed by hatchery, feed or medicine companies provided free consultancy by phone. Most (11/16) of the farmers had never received formal training in biosecurity. Two training sessions on avian influenza took place during our data collection; one was facilitated by the government and another by an NGO. Local vendors commonly received their information from veterinary practitioners from feed, chick or medicine companies. At one site, three farmers and most (3/4) vendors stated a government veterinarian provided private consultations outside office hours and visited the farms for a fee. Farmers' perceptions and practices related to farming and biosecurity reflected the perceptions of their sources of information (Figure 2 ).
Perception of Poultry Disease and Avian Influenza
Farmers considered Newcastle and infectious bursal diseases the most dangerous diseases, since chickens did not survive, and considered cold both a disease and a cause of disease (Figure 2) . Farmers mentioned drowsiness, limelike or liquid defecation, loss of appetite, difficulty breathing, runny nose, swollen head, shaking head and ruffled feathers as signs of cold. Most (15/16) of the farmers reported hearing about 'bird flu.' A Tangail broiler farmer mentioned that bird flu only affected large farms and not in small farms raising less than 2000 chickens. There were no large farms nearby. Nine farmers did not believe that bird flu could be transmitted to humans. Farmers who experienced culling and the vendors who was their source of information were skeptical whether the cause of infection in their farms was bird flu; they thought it might be Newcastle disease. 
Perception of Biosecurity
Four (4/16) farmers who spontaneously mentioned bird flu also mentioned knowing the term 'biosecurity' and related it to bird flu. Two of these four farmers received biosecurity training by the government and an NGO after culling their flocks. These two farmers equated 'biosecurity' and 'bird flu prevention' with fencing, which matched with the responses of the local vendor, who was their source of information (Figure 2) . The other two farmers received training from an NGO and provided a more detailed definition of biosecurity. All farmers mentioned a number of measures used to raise plump chickens and protect them from disease and harmful gas (mainly ammonia) such as using antibiotics, nutrition supplements, anti-protozoa medications, vaccines, using a footbath before entering the shed, and maintaining rest days between batches. These measure partially or fully matched standard biosecurity measures. Vaccination for Newcastle, infectious bursal diseases, cholera and fowlpox were most frequently (14/16) mentioned. To prevent cold, which broiler farmers considered a trigger for weight loss and other diseases, broiler farmers moved the dry litter in a sweeping motion 1-3 times daily with their feet or a sickle to release gas and keep the litter dry.
Six vendors reported knowing the English term 'biosecurity' and most frequently mentioned restricting birds, animals and humans from entering the shed as measures. Some farmers, like their sources of information, emphasized spraying, while some others related biosecurity with 'gas management' (Figure 2) .
Constraints, Motivation and Alternatives to the Standard Biosecurity Measures
Farmers mentioned constraints to implementing many biosecurity measures (Table 5 ) and reported practicing alternatives to some of the recommended biosecurity measures, such as using cheaper net instead of bamboo fencing, separate sandals instead of gumboots and sprayers for disinfection instead of footbaths. Their motivation was mostly related to reducing mortality and raising healthy chickens as opposed to preventing 'bird flu.' The team did not find any noticeable difference in biosecurity practices between the two farmers who experienced culling and those who did not. However, the two farmers who experienced culling were more aware about 'bird flu' and biosecurity measures than most other farmers following their exposure to an outbreak and training.
DISCUSSION
The practices and infrastructure observed in the farms were inconsistent with the three principle elements of biosecurity. Farmers' perception of biosecurity, transmission and prevention of avian influenza were also inconsistent with standard definitions. However, farmers' practices and perceptions were consistent with recommendations and perceptions of local vendors. Financial constraints and inconvenience were major reasons for not complying with certain biosecurity measures.
Segregation is considered to be the most effective element of biosecurity (FAO 2008) but was not observed in the farms we studied. The proximity of poultry sheds to humans, roads or water bodies, and the movement of objects, people and other animals in and out of the sheds, allowing vehicles inside the gate, has been identified as a risk factors for H5N1 outbreaks (Alhaji and Odetokun 2011; Ahmed et al. 2012; Gilbert and Pfeiffer 2012; Osmani et al. 2014) . Rodents may also be important vectors, as they Cleaning is the second most effective element of biosecurity followed by disinfection (FAO 2008) . Farmers' cleaning and disinfection practices were tailored to their convenience and were inconsistent with the government recommendations (Department of Livestock Services 2010). Farmers' hygiene behaviors placed them and their families at risk of transmission of HPAI, campylobacter and other diseases (Sarkar et al. 2014) . Improper management of litter, as observed in the study farms, can be particularly risky, since avian influenza viruses remain infectious in fecal materials for over seven days at 20°C (Webster et al. 1978) . Farmers sold feces as fish feed, which served as a means of disposal and supplemented their income. However, using untreated feces as fish feed is discouraged (WHO 2006) ; it may contribute to the spread of avian influenza among ducks, other wild birds and humans sharing the same water bodies.
Cost and inconvenience are major constraints to practicing recommended biosecurity measures. Poultry farming was the main source of household income for most of these farmers. They maintain larger flocks compared to backyard raisers, for whom poultry raising is mainly a source of nutrition and cash in-hand for household women (Sultana et al. 2012a; Shanta et al. 2016) . Small commercial farmers used measures that had an added cost to keep their poultry healthy and profitable, such as using disinfectants, rodenticides and aeration of feces. Damp litter causes emission of odorous gases, particularly ammonia, which is harmful for both poultry and human health and is one of the most important factors affecting broiler production (Ritz et al. 2004) .
Farmers' practices and perceptions of measures to protect poultry show that they valued the information gained from local vendors. This reflects the 'source credibility' of the vendors over the government veterinarians and trainings that were focused on avian influenza. Other studies also reported feed vendors and the agriculture demonstrator, who spent a long time with the farmers, as credible sources of information in farming (Kakade 2013; Tikwe et al. 2015) . Suppliers, hatcheries, feed and medicine companies also have an interest in supporting the poultry businesses run by these farmers. Leveraging these stakeholders' interest in a systematic way may be useful to increase awareness among these farmers and motivate them to follow stricter biosecurity.
Biosecurity conditions in these small commercial farms in Bangladesh were similar to those reported from other countries, suggesting that these practices, which increase the risk of a global influenza pandemic, are common in this sector. Small commercial farms in Egypt were often accessible to birds and rodents; workers practiced unsafe carcass disposal and inadequate personal hygiene (NegroCalduch et al. 2013) , but always applied vaccines for Newcastle disease and infectious bursal disease and did not allow collectors to enter the shed (Pagani and Kilany 2007) , as found in our study farms. Like our study farms, Kenyan farms had similar poultry housing structures in close proximity to the dwellings and workers had poor personal hygiene (Nyaga 2007) .
We conducted this study in only 16 farms; hence, the findings may not be generalizable to the 52,387 registered (Department of Livestock Services 2012) and likely even more numerous unregistered small commercial farms of the country. However, the high-risk practices we observed are similar to the findings of a nationwide supply chain analysis of poultry, which reported biosecurity practices of broiler and layer farms (Yunus et al. 2008) , and another study reporting proximity to other farms and roads, rearing system, entry restrictions, use of disinfection, footwear and rodent control in 40 broiler farms (Rahman et al. 2010) . These studies presented a quantitative assessment of knowledge and practices related to biosecurity. Our study provides an in-depth understanding of farmers' practices and perceptions of biosecurity, their reasoning behind their practices, constraints and motivation to practicing biosecurity, and the information flow from the sources to the farmers that influenced farmers' practices. These data could be useful for revising biosecurity recommendations and selecting communication channels for these farmers. These data can also give direction to what needs to be explored in similar settings in other countries in order to develop feasible recommendations and communication channels that might work.
While we seldom observed flock segregation, handwashing, or the use of personal protective equipment, some farmers used several measures that involved additional cost or effort. Responses of the farmers reflect that despite higher awareness of avian influenza than backyard raisers (Sultana et al. 2012b) , small commercial farmers also perceived bird flu as a disease that occurred in distant places and would not affect them or their farms. This might result from failure to identify the avian influenza through observation (Rimi et al. 2016) , since most signs of avian influenza are similar to those of Newcastle disease (Nidzworski et al. 2013) . These farmers were more concerned about diseases they perceived as more common in their flocks than HPAI and presented more salient threats to their profitability. These findings suggest that small commercial farmers could be motivated to maintain biosecurity with interventions that protect their investment and maintain profitability by keeping their flock safe from diseases they consider harmful through the involvement of local vendors they value. A study in Egypt showed that the benefit-cost ratio for implementing biosecurity measures was 8.45 against HPAI and 4.88 against Newcastle disease for household poultry (Fasina et al. 2012 ). Although the government recommended different biosecurity measures for different commercial poultry sectors, the recommendations mostly included general measures for all farm sizes (Department of Livestock Services 2010), which may not be practical for small farms. Biosecurity recommendations could be tailored to account for socioeconomic realities of small commercial farmers (FAO 2008) . Future interventions could explore the potential feasibility and effectiveness of low-cost alternatives to recommended biosecurity measures.
